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ABSTRACT 
 
Business students may dream of receiving pay packages like that of Michael Eisner at Disney. 
However, many of them will work for the compensation consultant who determines the economics 
of the pay arrangements, for the valuation consultant who values the different components of the 
pay arrangements, for the accountant who must audit the financial statement impacts of the pay 
arrangements, or as a manager in the company whose employees respond to the incentives 
provided by the pay arrangements. No matter their eventual role, it is critical that every student 
understands these various aspects of executive pay arrangements, and how these practices have 
evolved over time. The course module presented herein is designed to effectively integrate these 
perspectives in as few as five or as many as nine 80-minute sessions that could be a substantive 
component of an MBA or Master of Accounting capstone course, or a component of a corporate 
governance elective. A case based on the CEO compensation of Boeing Inc. over the last 60 years 
provides a series of assignments that effectively integrate the module. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he importance of incorporating a module on incentives of corporate leaders into business education 
cannot be overstated. It is critical that students be able to analyze the agency problems inherent in a 
business scenario, as well as understand the implications and effectiveness of pay plans in 
mitigating—or exacerbating—these problems. This module presents an efficient and relatively comprehensive 
coverage of the economics, finance, and accounting issues related to executive pay arrangements. 
 
This module is structured to address the following questions: 
 
 What is the principal-agent problem and how does it relate to corporate managers? 
 What types of compensation arrangements do companies use to align the incentives of managers and 
shareholders?  
 What disclosure requirements and other regulations are in effect for executive pay over this timeframe? 
 How do we determine the fair value of cash- and stock-based compensation?  
 Is the fair value the same for the company and the executives? 
 Why has the level of executive pay increased so much? 
 Which measure of company performance should we tie executive pay to? 
 How strong is the relation between executive pay and company performance? How strong should it be? 
 How has the accounting for executive pay in the company’s financial statements evolved over time? 
 What are the current accounting standards for stock-based compensation? 
 Have executive stock options changed in response to the changes in accounting standards for stock-based 
compensation? 
 
T 
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There are three major pedagogical components in the module: a research component, a case component, 
and an optional writing component. The research component relies on a series of recommended research papers, any 
or all of which can be assigned for students to read. The case component is based on a unique dataset consisting of 
the CEO compensation of Boeing Inc. from 1950-2009. This 60-year dataset allows students to see practical 
implementation of the theoretical ideas discussed in the research papers, and to follow the evolution of 
compensation arrangements over time. The optional integrative writing component requires students to design, 
implement, and write-up their own mini-research study.  
 
To complete the full module as described, students will be required to complete challenging readings, 
manipulate data graphically, utilize a Black Scholes option valuation model, run a linear regression, and write about 
technical issues. However, the module allows for flexibility in implementation. For example, rather than assign 
extensive reading of the research papers, the faculty member can summarize the research papers in a lecture, or ask 
students to read only certain sections of (some of) the papers. The faculty member may illustrate the option 
valuation and/or the linear regression analyses in class. Finally, the faculty member could complete certain parts of 
the mini-research study in class and then allow students (or student teams) to focus on the write-up. Note that all 
compensation and performance data is available in an Excel spreadsheet from the corresponding author on request. 
 
Below is a teaching plan based on nine 80-minute sessions (i.e., 12 contact hours). A topic and learning 
goals are provided for each session. References to recommended research papers are also provided. Specific 
assignments for the data from Boeing Inc. are included for each session. Finally several Harvard Business School 
cases are recommended for possible supplementation. 
 
A number of the sessions are denoted as optional, to allow the implementation of a shorter module. 
Specifically, the shorter module requires five 80-minute sessions (i.e., 6.7 contact hours). Any modules that are 
skipped can be discussed briefly by the instructor during an adjacent session. 
 
TEACHING PLAN 
 
 
Session 1 
Topic: What is the principal-agent problem and how does it relate to corporate managers?  
Learning goal: Students will understand and be able to discuss principal-agent problems stemming from the 
information asymmetry and moral hazard that result from hiring specialized managers to run a company. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Assignment to be completed after class: Read about the history of Boeing Inc. at the company website: 
http://www.boeing.com/history/index.html. Note significant events in the history of Boeing that you think might 
affect the incentives of the senior executives and the CEO.  
Deliverable: Each team should turn in a timeline of their noted events in the history of Boeing that affect the 
incentives of the senior executives and the CEO. Define years as the horizontal axis and make the timeline no longer 
than two 8.5x11 pages with landscape orientation. This timeline should be created in Microsoft excel and allow 
room to add additional data as the course continues (see assignments below). 
 
We suggest using class time to discuss examples of activities where the outcome is partly a function of inputs (e.g., 
effort) and partly a function of chance (e.g., external events over which you have no control). Then, building on 
these ideas, we recommend a discussion of how to pay for effort when it is unobservable, and what the consequences 
are for managerial behavior. A nice basis for this discussion is presented in Christensen and Feltham (2005, 3-6). 
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Session 2 (optional) 
Topic: What types of compensation arrangements do companies use to align the incentives of managers and 
shareholders? What disclosure requirements and other regulations are in effect for executive pay over this 
timeframe? 
Learning goal: Students will understand and be able to discuss various components of compensation (e.g., salary, 
bonus, stock options, stock grants, pensions etc.) and how these components have been regulated and reported to 
shareholders over time. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read Lynch and Perry (2003); Examine the CEO pay data presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Read Murphy (2011). 
Assignment to be completed during or after class: Compare the excerpts from Boeing’s proxy statement for 1960 in 
Table 3 and the proxy for 1980 in Table 4 with the proxy statement from the SEC website (www.sec.gov) for fiscal 
2009 (note that the proxy filing is labeled “DEF 14A” and is issued in early 2010).   
Deliverable: Each team should turn in an updated timeline after adding notations for the significant regulatory 
changes and disclosure changes. 
 
We suggest using class time to walk through Boeing’s 2009 proxy and discuss how it differs from the excerpts in 
Tables 3 and 4, tying each section back to the discussion in Murphy (2011). It is important at this stage to 
emphasize the difference between grants of stock and grants of stock options.  
 
 
Session 3 
Topic: How do we determine the fair value of cash- and stock-based compensation? Is the fair value the same for 
the company and the executives? 
Learning goal: Students will understand the factors that determine the relative costs of stock vs. cash compensation 
to the firm and assess the factors that influence how executives value these two types of compensation. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Look at Black and Scholes (1973);  
Assignment to be completed during or after class: Use the data in Table 2 to value Boeing’s stock options based on 
the Black Scholes model (including dividends). An excel template for Black-Scholes option valuation is available in 
Appendix A. Read Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991). 
Deliverable: Each team should turn in an updated timeline after adding a stacked bar chart that accumulates all the 
components of CEO pay into one column per year. 
 
We suggest using class time to review the Black-Scholes model, do an example valuation, and remind students how 
changes in the various assumptions result in increases or decreases in the valuation. At this point, it can be useful to 
also emphasize the differences between intrinsic value, Black-Scholes value, and exercise gains.  
 
 
Session 4 
Topic: Why has the level of executive pay increased so much? 
Learning goal: Students will examine the market forces and internal forces that could be at play in raising CEO pay, 
including the role of executive compensation consulting firms in explaining this phenomenon. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002); Murphy and Sandino (2010); 
Cadman et al. (2010). Determine whether Boeing uses compensation consultants. If so, do these consultants work 
for the company or the board of directors, and how much are these consultants paid? 
Deliverable: Each individual should turn in a one page opinion piece taking a stance on whether you believe CEOs 
are paid fairly, incorporating the ideas of the research papers above. Documents should be single-spaced, with one 
inch margins and 11 point Times Roman font. 
 
We suggest using class time to discuss the contrasting views on CEO pay. This is an excellent time to invite a 
compensation professional to speak to the class, if you have someone available. 
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Session 5 (optional) 
Topic: Which measure of company performance should we tie executive pay to?  
Learning goal: Students will understand and be able to discuss the challenges surrounding the goal of selecting 
performance measures that align the incentives of managers and shareholders, along with whether and how to hold 
managers responsible for outcomes they do not control. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read  Albuquerque (2009). Consider some of the attributes of the data on 
Boeing’s performance presented in Table 1. 
Deliverable: Each team should turn in an updated timeline after adding Boeing’s performance:  the total stock 
returns, ROA (e.g., return on assets), and the return on the market index. Introduce a second y-axis and use lines for 
the performance data. 
 
We suggest using class time to discuss the differences between stock returns, market returns, and accounting-based 
return on investment (ROA). It is useful to emphasize the differences in volatility among the three measures. The 
ideas behind relative performance evaluation (RPE) may require some discussion and explanation.  
 
 
Session 6 
Topic: How strong is the relation between executive pay and company performance? How strong should it be? 
Learning goal: Students will investigate the relation between executive pay and company performance using 
regression analysis, and will interpret their findings in the context of the related research questions. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read introductions and conclusions of Jensen and Murphy (1990); 
Garvey and Milbourn (2006); Dial and Murphy (1995) 
Assignment to be completed after class: Estimate linear regression models of Boeing’s CEO pay on measures of 
performance to investigate whether (1) Boeing’s CEO pay is significantly associated with its performance, (2) 
Boeing pays its CEO for “luck” (i.e., does not control for market performance), and (3) Boeing pays its CEO for 
good performance but does not penalize him for poor performance.    
Deliverable: Each team should turn in a two page summary of conclusions from the regression analysis. Documents 
should be single-spaced, with one inch margins and 11 point Times Roman font. One appendix of up to two pages 
should be attached with your regression results. A second appendix should be attached with your finalized timeline. 
Optional Related case: General Dynamics: Compensation and Strategy (A) and (B). 
 
We suggest using class time to review regression analysis and to interpret some of the regressions run in Jensen and 
Murphy (1990). It may be important to explain how to use interaction terms and dummy variables. 
 
 
Session 7 (optional) 
Topic: How has the accounting for executive pay in the company’s financial statements evolved over time? 
Learning goal: Students will understand the evolution of accounting for stock-based compensation from APB 25 
through SFAS No. 123R, the unintended consequences of these standards, and the challenges of the standard setting 
process. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read Jones and Smith (2012). Then, go to www.sec.gov and look at 
Boeing’s 10-Ks for fiscal years 2009 and 1997. How much expense is recognized for the stock options Boeing 
granted to all employees in each of these years?  If the current accounting standards had been in place in 1997, how 
much expense would have been recognized? How do the disclosures about employee stock options differ in these 
two years? 
Assignment to be completed after class: Read Lie (2005). 
 
We recommend using class time to walk through Jones and Smith (2012) and discuss the political aspects of 
standard setting. It is useful to work through the examples of accounting for “fixed” and” variable” options. It is 
probably important to emphasize that most companies continued to use APB 25 accounting when the original SFAS 
No. 123 was passed—only their disclosures changed. This process sets up the students to understand the motivation 
behind option back-dating in Lie (2005).  
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Session 8 
Topic: What are the current accounting standards for stock-based compensation? 
Learning goal: Students will understand the basic accounting for stock options under SFAS No. 123R, including 
accounting for service, performance and market conditions. 
Assignment to be completed before class: Read Topic 718 in the Codification (or SFAS No. 123R). 
Assignment to be completed after class: Refer to Boeing’s most current proxy statement. Do you see any new types 
of stock options granted to executives (e.g., indexed options, performance-based options)? 
 
Students will have difficulty understanding the current accounting for stock options (i.e., SFAS No. 123R), and it 
may be useful to narrow the scope of their reading. We suggest using class time to discuss some examples of stock 
options with service conditions, performance conditions, and market conditions.  Also, it is important to emphasize 
that these new types of options (e.g., with performance or market conditions) may provide substantially improved 
incentives to executives. This sets up the students to understand why we would be interested in investigating whether 
more companies began using these more complex (but possibly superior) options when SFAS No. 123R was 
implemented.  
 
 
Session 9 (optional) 
Topic: Have executive stock options changed in response to the changes in accounting standards for stock-based 
compensation? [Note: this session could be used instead as a continuation of Session 8 if more time is desired to 
cover that topic.] 
Learning goal: Students will experience conducting a mini-research study that includes a literature review, data 
gathering, and descriptive statistics. 
Assignment to be completed after class: Conduct your own research study on the question of whether the change in 
accounting standards is associated with a significant increase in the use of more complex types of options (e.g., 
market indexed options).  Search for research or popular press articles that address this issue. Search for companies 
that have changed their option plans, collect data, and report descriptive statistics. Carefully describe your methods.  
Do you find any evidence that the change in accounting standards has resulted in changes in the types of options 
granted to CEOs?  
Deliverable: Each team should turn in a research paper, maximum 6 pages of writing, not including exhibits, 
appendices, and references. An appendix should show all data used in the analysis, in table form. Documents should 
be single-spaced, with one inch margins and 11 point Times Roman font. 
Grading Rubric: See Ahlawat et al. (2012) for an excellent research paper grading rubric. 
 
We suggest using class time to further reinforce the current accounting for stock compensation and discussing how 
to lay out a research paper. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this module we provide a course of study for important aspects of executive pay arrangements and how 
they address agency problems in public corporations. The module includes components on research, case analysis, 
and an optional writing assignment. The module also presents a unique 60-year time-series of compensation and 
performance data set for Boeing Inc. that allows a unique opportunity to examine the evolution of executive pay 
arrangements. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Excel Spreadsheet for Option Valuation using Black-Scholes model 
 
This exhibit illustrates the valuation of an option with a 3-year-life and a $50 strike price granted when the market 
price also is $50, where the risk-free rate = 3%, volatility = 30% and dividends are $0.50 per year (for a yield of 
1%). 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
A B C D E F G H
Fair Value
3 50.00$   50.00$   30.00% 3.00% 1.00%
PVstock PVstrike Cum.Vol. Prop.Stock Prop.Strike
48.52$   45.73$   51.96% 64.58% -44.21%
Intermediate 
Calculations
Inputs 
Expected 
Life Stock Strike
Expected 
Volatility
Expected Risk-
Free Rate
Expected   
Div. Yield
$11.12
 =D4/(1+F4/2)^(B4*2)
 =-NORMSDIST(LN(B7/C7)/D7-D7/2)
 =NORMSDIST(LN(B7/C7)/D7+D7/2)
=NORMSDIST(LN(B7/C7)/D7+D7/2)
 =E4*SQRT(B4)
 =C4/(1+G4/4)^(B4*4)
 =+B7*E7+C7*F7
Notes:  
The inputs at the top of this page are typed into the spreadsheet.
The intermediate calculations are formulas that need to be typed exactly as they appear.
PVstock is the present value of the stock price.
PVstrike is the present value of the strike price.
Cum.Vol. is the cumulative volatility over the life of the option
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Table 1 
Boeing Inc. Data on CEO Compensation and Performance 
Year Name Position 
Base Pay  
(000) 
Code 
Bonus  
(000) 
Other  
(000) 
LTIP  
(000) 
Change in  
Pension (000) 
Value of Stock 
Grant (000) 
Boeing annual 
stock return 
Boeing 
ROA 
Value-
weighted 
Market Index 
1950 Allen CEO $67.3 SB      94.20% 8.73% 30.02% 
1951 Allen CEO $86.0 SB      16.60% 4.42% 20.83% 
1952 Allen CEO $86.9 SB      45.00% 6.82% 13.29% 
1953 Allen CEO $101.6 SB      28.50% 6.74% 0.35% 
1954 Allen CEO $107.5 SB      224.50% 11.50% 50.18% 
1955 Allen CEO $118.4 SB      12.90% 10.16% 25.30% 
1956 Allen CEO $117.4 SB      61.60% 9.68% 8.47% 
1957 Allen CEO $120.1 SB      -34.50% 7.77% -10.37% 
1958 Allen CEO $135.2 SB      33.10% 4.85% 44.83% 
1959 Allen P $130.8 AR      -30.60% 2.09% 12.60% 
1960 Allen P $135.2 AR      24.00% 4.55% 1.16% 
1961 Allen P $139.4 AR      41.40% 6.04% 26.94% 
1962 Allen P $144.2 AR      -22.50% 4.19% -10.32% 
1963 Allen P $137.1 AR      2.00% 3.27% 20.89% 
1964 Allen P $148.9 AR      99.40% 6.96% 16.30% 
1965 Allen P $161.9 AR  $4.0    95.10% 10.27% 14.39% 
1966 Allen P $175.0 AR  $4.3    8.50% 5.27% -8.69% 
1967 Allen P $186.5 AR  $4.6    39.80% 4.13% 28.57% 
1968 Allen CB&P $198.5 AR  $4.9    -36.00% 3.80% 14.17% 
1969 Wilson P&CEO $180.5 AR  $5.9    -49.00% 0.39% -10.84% 
1970 Wilson P&CEO $139.8 AR  $8.5    -48.10% 0.84% 0.07% 
1971 Wilson P&CEO $124.5 AR  $8.3    33.60% 1.71% 16.20% 
1972 Wilson CB&CEO $141.3 AR  $8.1    36.50% 1.43% 17.34% 
1973 Wilson CB&CEO $180.1 AR  $9.1    -49.40% 3.04% -18.75% 
1974 Wilson CB&CEO $239.2 AR  $11.8    32.90% 4.15% -27.94% 
1975 Wilson CB&CEO $295.2 AR  $11.8    61.20% 4.27% 37.36% 
1976 Wilson CB&CEO $341.3 AR  $13.0    89.90% 5.36% 26.77% 
1977 Wilson CB&CEO $397.0 AR  $15.8    29.90% 7.39% -2.98% 
1978 Wilson CB&CEO $516.7 SB      163.90% 9.04% 8.54% 
1979 Wilson CB&CEO $551.9 SB      11.50% 10.32% 24.41% 
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Table 1, continued 
Year Name Position 
Base Pay 
(000) 
Code 
Bonus 
(000) 
Other 
(000) 
LTIP 
(000) 
Pension 
(000) 
Stock 
(000) 
Stock 
Return 
ROA 
Market 
Index 
1980 Wilson CB&CEO $649.3 SB      35.70% 10.12% 33.24% 
1981 Wilson CB&CEO $751.3 SB      -46.30% 6.80% -3.99% 
1982 Wilson CB&CEO $807.4 SB      60.50% 3.85% 20.42% 
1983 Wilson CB&CEO $873.2 CC      33.80% 4.75% 22.65% 
1984 Wilson CB&CEO $996.8 CC      33.40% 9.28% 3.16% 
1985 Wilson CB&CEO $998.0 CC      41.60% 6.12% 31.41% 
1986 Shrontz P&CEO $674.4 CC      0.00% 3.01% 15.56% 
1987 Shrontz P&CEO $737.2 CC      -25.40% 3.82% 1.83% 
1988 Shrontz P&CEO $846.3 CC      68.50% 4.87% 17.56% 
1989 Shrontz CB&CEO $910.3 CC      50.20% 7.33% 28.43% 
1990 Shrontz CB&CEO $1094.5 CC      16.90% 9.49% -6.08% 
1991 Shrontz CB&CEO $1188.0 CC     $188.4 7.50% 9.93% 33.64% 
1992 Shrontz CB&CEO $821.4 S $554.0 $55.5 $185.0  $184.0 -13.90% 3.04% 9.07% 
1993 Shrontz CB&CEO $796.9 S $624.0 $66.7 $218.4  $170.2 10.70% 6.08% 11.58% 
1994 Shrontz CB&CEO $844.8 S $600.0 $75.0 $404.8  $149.2 11.10% 3.99% -0.76% 
1995 Shrontz CB&CEO $944.1 S $712.0 $85.3 $573.9  $287.1 69.60% 1.78% 35.67% 
1996 Condit P&CEO $694.8 S $639.0 $58.0   $258.7 37.56% 4.02% 21.16% 
1997 Condit CB&CEO $884.7 S $446.0 $69.5   $204.4 -7.12% -0.47% 30.33% 
1998 Condit CB&CEO $998.9 S $0 $81.8   $192.2 -32.43% 3.05% 22.28% 
1999 Condit CB&CEO $1093.1 S $1900.8 $86.3   $1431.5 28.77% 6.39% 25.27% 
2000 Condit CB&CEO $1359.2 S $1978.2 $187.3 $12104.6  $3068.6 61.20% 5.06% -11.08% 
2001 Condit CB&CEO $1479.2 S $1134.0 $296.7   $1127.2 -40.44% 5.85% -11.27% 
2002 Condit CB&CEO $1547.3 S $982.8 $444.4   $903.4 -13.45% 0.94% -20.84% 
2003 Condit CB&CEO $1620.0 S $599.0 $483.1   $621.3 30.40% 1.35% 33.14% 
2004 Stonecipher P&CEO $1500.0 S $1260.0 $819.5   $1234.8 24.81% 3.47% 13.00% 
2005 McNerney CB&P&CEO $841.3 S $2297.5 $426.6   $25289.9 37.84% 4.28% 7.32% 
2006 McNerney CB&P&CEO $1750.0 S $4025.0 $2063.5  $1149.9 $8712.3 28.40% 4.28% 16.22% 
2007 McNerney CB&P&CEO $1800.1 S $4299.5 $966.3  $3459.1 $4845.5 -0.08% 6.91% 7.30% 
2008 McNerney CB&P&CEO $1915.3 S $1476.5 $846.1 $4613.1 $1860.8 $2660.2 -49.97% 4.97% -38.31% 
2009 McNerney CB&P&CEO $1930.0 S $2340.3 $1002.6 $2160.0 $5738.0 $3136.3 31.90% 2.11% 31.63% 
Positions held by the top executive are denoted as follows: chairman of the board (CB); president (P); chief executive officer (CEO). Compensation base pay includes the measure 
of base pay reported in the proxy as follows: salary plus bonus (SB); aggregate remuneration (AR); cash compensation (CC); salary (S). Bonus is presented separately where it is 
disclosed separately. LTIP is long-term incentive pay. Pension is the change in the value of the executive’s pension plan. Stock is the value of Boeing shares of stock granted to the 
executive (not stock options). ROA is net income ÷ total assets; Stock return is measured annually and includes dividends; Market return is based on the value-weighted market 
index; both returns are based on aggregated monthly returns from CRSP.  
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Table 2 
Boeing Inc. CEO Stock Option Grant Data 
Year Name Grant Date 
Number of 
Options 
Term 
Strike 
Price ($) 
 Volatility (%) Dividend Yield (%) Risk-Free Rate (%) 
1958 Allen unknown 3000 10 48.8750  31.40 3.13 3.86 
1959 Allen unknown 7500 10 30.5000  31.99 2.83 4.69 
1970 Wilson unknown 10,000 5 20.8750  36.98 2.27 5.95 
1972 Wilson unknown 14,000 5 23.0000  42.14 1.73 6.16 
1974 Wilson unknown 12,000 5 13.2500  45.01 4.59 7.31 
1976 Wilson unknown 6,500 5 27.5000  38.15 3.38 6.10 
1978 Wilson unknown 10,500 5 46.3250  34.58 3.71 9.08 
1980 Wilson unknown 15,750 5 44.5000  35.37 3.59 13.25 
1981 Wilson unknown 15,000 5 37.0000  36.25 4.76 13.60 
1982 Wilson unknown 20,000 5 18.7500  45.06 6.38 10.22 
1983 Wilson unknown 17,500 5 36.1250  42.20 3.47 11.54 
1984 Wilson unknown 25,000 10 42.6250  41.42 2.95 11.50 
1985 Wilson unknown 37,500 10 42.2500  38.80 2.39 9.26 
1986 Shrontz unknown 40,000 10 53.6875  37.19 2.17 7.11 
1987 Shrontz unknown 30,000 10 54.3750  27.89 3.00 8.99 
1988 Shrontz unknown 30,000 10 46.5625  27.50 2.77 9.11 
1989 Shrontz unknown 45,000 10 42.8750  26.91 2.36 7.84 
1990 Shrontz unknown 52,500 10 43.1250  29.49 2.05 8.08 
1991 Shrontz unknown 31,875 10 48.1250  29.16 2.09 7.09 
1992 Shrontz 2/28/1992 31,875 10 46.0000  26.23 2.43 6.77 
1993 Shrontz 2/26/1993 31,875 10 34.5000  24.89 2.63 5.77 
1993 Shrontz 12/13/1993 200,000 5 40.5600  24.89 2.63 5.77 
1994 Shrontz 2/29/1994 53,125 10 47.2500  23.48 2.22 7.81 
1995 Shrontz 2/27/1995 177,883 10 46.5000  21.35 1.63 5.71 
1996 Condit 2/26/1996 75,000 10 82.0000  20.03 1.22 6.30 
1997 Condit 2/24/1997 120,000 10 53.2188  20.32 1.14 5.81 
2003 Condit 4/28/2003 3,000 10 28.2230  35.05 2.04 4.27 
2006 McNerney 2/27/2006 261,000 10 74.4500  24.21 1.51 4.56 
2007 McNerney 2/26/2007 215,000 10 89.6500  21.55 1.47 4.10 
2008 McNerney 2/25/2008 252,000 10 83.9300  23.79 2.41 2.42 
2009 McNerney 2/23/2009 282,037 10 35.5700  31.20 3.75 3.59 
Note that Mr. Shrontz received two stock option grants in 1993.  In all cases, the strike price is equal to the stock price on the day of the grant. 
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Table 3 
Partial Excerpt on Executive Pay from Boeing Inc. Proxy Statement dated May 3, 1960 
Remuneration of Directors and Officers 
     Set forth below is the aggregate remuneration (including awards under the Incentive Compensation Plan which relate to the year 1958 but were paid in 1959: (1) to each 
Director and each of the three highest paid officers of the company whose aggregate remuneration exceeded $30,000, and (2) to all Directors and officers of the Company as a 
group; and the estimated annual benefits each of such persons will be paid under the Company’s retirement plan upon retirement at the normal retirement date: 
 
Name and Individual or Identity of Group and Capacities 
in Which Remuneration Was Received Aggregate Remuneration 
Estimated Net Remuneration After Deduction of 
Estimated Federal Income Taxes 
Estimated Annual 
Benefits Upon Retirement 
WILLIAM M. ALLEN, President $124,519 $54,070 $22,607 
WELLWOOD E. BEALL, Senior Vice President 87,882 44,481 27,196 
FRED P. LAUDAN, Vice President Manufacturing 43,542 28,270 11,413 
EDWARD C. WELLS, Vice President Engineering 76,165 40,768 24,676 
J. O. YEASTING, Vice President Finance  59,028 34,554 14,808 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS AS A GROUP 904,602  233,607 
Note: original footnotes deleted. 
 
STOCK OPTIONS GRANTED 
 
On December 22, 1959, the Stock Option Committee, acting pursuant to the provisions of the Stock Option Plan adopted by the stockholders at the Annual Meeting held 
May 6, 1958, granted options to purchase capital stock of the Company of the par value of $5 a share to 55 employees, for a total of 71,000 shares at an option price of $30.50 per 
share, which was the closing price of capital stock of the Company on the New York Stock Exchange on the date the options were granted. The options are evidenced by 
agreements between the Company and the employees to whom such options were granted, the material provisions of which may be summarized as follows: 
 
The options may be exercised at any time, and from time to time, after the expiration of two years after the date of the agreements, but only to the extent of the following 
cumulative percentages of the total number of shares covered by the options during the periods of time indicated: 
 
2 years after date of agreement—up to 20% 
4 years after date of agreement—up to 40% 
6 years after date of agreement—up to 70% 
8 years after date of agreement—up to 100% 
 
The options expire ten years after the date of the agreements or on the date the employee’s employment with the Company terminates, whichever first occurs, except that 
(i) If an employee retires under the Company’s retirement plan or by reason of his health, the option may be exercised as to all remaining shares at any time within three months 
after such termination of employment, and (ii) If the employment of an employee is terminated by death the option may be exercised as to all remaining shares within one year 
after the date of employee’s death by the person to whom the employee’s rights under the agreement pass by the applicable laws of descent and distribution. The employee’s rights 
under the option agreement are non-assignable and the number of shares is subject to adjustment for stock dividends, stock splits, or other changes in the capital stock of the 
Company. The options are restricted stock options within the meaning of that term as used in Section 421 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code. 
 
The persons named in the table under the heading “Remuneration of Directors and Officers” to whom options were granted and the number of shares covered thereby 
and similar information with respect to all directors and officers as a group is set forth in the following table: 
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Table 3, continued 
Name Present Office Number of Shares 
WILLIAM M. ALLEN President 7500 
WELLWOOD E. BEALL Senior Vice President 4,750 
FRED P. LAUDAN Vice President—Manufacturing 1,000 
EDWARD C. WELLS Vice President—Engineering  4,250 
J. O. YEASTING Vice President—General Manager, Transport Division 4,000 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS AS A GROUP 39,750 
Note: original footnotes deleted. 
 
 
Table 4 
Partial Excerpt on Executive Pay from Boeing Inc. Proxy Statement dated March 7, 1980 
MANAGEMENT REMUNERATION 
 
The following is a description of the types of remuneration included in each column of the table on [the next page]: 
 
Incentive Compensation 
The Company’s Incentive Compensation Plan, initially adopted by the stockholders in 1947, provides, in general, that for any year the Board of Directors may set aside 
into a fund an amount not to exceed 6% of net earnings for the year (before provisions are made for federal and state income taxes). Awards are made out of such funds at such 
time or times and to such officers and employees as may be determined by the Compensation Committee, or, when so authorized by that committee, as may be determined by the 
Chief Executive Officer of the Company or his authorized delegate. Members of the committee are not eligible for awards and no awards in excess of 5% of the amount set aside in 
the fund for any one year may be made to any one officer or employee. The following awards are payable in cash: (a) awards the payment of which is to be deferred pursuant to the 
terms of the awards of deferred compensation arrangements; (b) awards to holders of exercisable stock options who elect to have their awards applied all or in part to the payment 
for shares as to which options have been exercised; and (c) awards made by the Chief Executive Officer or his authorized delegate. All other awards may be paid in cash or in 
common stock of the Company, or in any combination thereof, at the discretion of the committee. The number of shares of common stock, if any, issued in payment of any award 
is determined by the committee based on the market price on the distribution date of the award. The Company has a Deferred Compensation Plan for Employees pursuant to which 
Messrs. T. A. Wilson, H. W. Haynes, and O. C. Boileau and certain other officers have elected that all or specified portions of Incentive Compensation Plan awards will not be 
paid currently but will be credited to deferred compensation accounts and be paid to them over periods of years following their retirement from or termination of active 
employment with the Company. Their deferred account balances are also credited quarterly with interest established annually based upon industrial bond rates for the previous year 
as reported by Moody’s Investor Service. The interest rate for 1979 was 8.5%. 
 
All Incentive Compensation awards attributable to 1979 performance are included in Column C-1 of the table. Interest credited to deferred compensation accounts during 
1979 is included in Column C-2. 
 
Voluntary Investment Plan 
Under the Company’s present Voluntary Investment Plan which became effective in its original form on December 1, 1965, all eligible hourly and salaried employees, 
including officers, may contribute from 1% to 8% of their base wage or salary to any one or more of four separate investment trust funds, each of which has a different investment 
objective. All employees are eligible except those within collective bargaining units which have not agreed to the Plan and certain nonresident aliens. The Company contributes an 
amount equal to 50% of the employee’s contribution. The Company’s contribution becomes fully vested after five years. The funds become distributable to participants, with 
certain exceptions, upon termination of employment. Included in Column C-2 is the vested portion of the Company’s 1979 contribution to the employee’s account and the increase 
or decrease in value during 1979 of the previously vested amounts in the account. Included in Column D is the unvested portion of the Company’s 1979 contribution to the 
employee’s account. 
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Table 4, continued 
Financial Security Plan 
An employee Financial Security Plan was approved by the stockholders on April 25, 1966. Under the Plan, in which most of the employees of the Company participate, 
the Company makes contributions to a trust from current and accumulated earnings and profits on the basis of the number of hours in each employee’s sick leave reserve account 
(up to a maximum of 720 hours) multiplied by the employee’s hourly rate or base compensation. The Company’s contribution to the trust is invested in a balanced portfolio of 
securities. Funds may be withdrawn in the event of loss o earnings due to sickness and the balance becomes distributable upon termination of employment. Included in Column C-
2 of the table is the amount credited in 1979 to the employee’s account under the plan and the increase or decrease in value during 1979 of the employee’s account. 
 
Stock Options 
Options granted under the 1969 Stock Option Plan were granted at the market price on the data of grant. Nonqualified options granted under the 1969 Plan are 
exercisable in part after one year, with the remaining portions exercisable in increments after three, five and in most cases seven years, and expire ten years from the date of grant. 
Qualified options granted under the 1969 Plan are exercisable 50% after one year, 100% after three years and expire five years from the date of grant, and contain restrictions upon 
exercise if the optionee holds certain unexercised prior qualified options at a higher price. All options are subject to termination under certain conditions. No additional options 
may be granted under the 1969 Plan. 
 
Options granted under the 1979 Stock Option Plan which became effective January 1, 1979 were granted at the market price on the date of grant. There are 1,125,000 
shares currently authorized to be granted and issued under the 1979 Plan subject to adjustment for stock splits and similar adjustments in capital stock. Only nonqualified options 
may be granted by the Stock Option Committee. The terms and conditions of options granted under the 1979 Plan are similar to nonqualified options granted under the 1969 Plan. 
 
Included in Column C-2 of the table are amounts consisting of the difference between the option price and the market price of the Company’s stock on the date of 
exercise for all shares exercised during 1979 offset by any amounts attributable to such shares included in the remuneration table previously. Although such amounts are 
considered income for federal tax purposes, the Company makes no cash payment to the optionee. 
 
Stock Appreciation Rights 
At the sole discretion of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors, stock appreciation rights (“SAR’s”) may be granted in connection with all or part of any 
options granted under the 1969 or 1979 Stock Option Plans to employees who may be deemed directors or officers for purposes of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. SAR’s entitle the holder thereof, upon exercise of such rights, to surrender the related option or any portion thereof and to receive without payment to the Company (except 
for applicable withholding taxes) an amount equal to the excess of the fair market value on the date of such exercise of the stock covered by such option or portion thereof over the 
option price of such stock. The committee has sole discretion to determine the form in which payment will be made upon the exercise of any SAR (i.e., common stock, cash, or any 
combination thereof), or to consent to or disapprove the election of any participant to receive cash in full or partial settlement of the right. SAR’s may be exercised only during the 
ten business days beginning on the third day following announcement of the Company’s quarterly earnings. 
 
Payments made by the Company for all SAR’s exercised in 1979 are included in Column C-2 offset by any amounts attributable to such rights included in the 
remuneration table previously. For each SAR exercised, an exercisable option was surrendered. Included in Column D are amounts accrued for SAR’s which became exercisable 
in 1979 and were unexercised as of December 31, 1979, based on the difference between the option price and the market price of the Company’s stock on that date. 
 
Remuneration Table 
The following table sets forth information concerning the remuneration of (1) each of the five most highly compensated executive officers or directors of the Company 
whose total remuneration in Columns C-1 and C-2 combined exceeds $50,000, and (2) all remuneration of all officers and directors of the Company as a group for services in all 
capacities to the Company and its subsidiaries during 1979. 
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Table 4, continued 
(A) 
Name of Individual or 
Persons in Group 
(B) 
Capacities in Which Served 
 
(C-1) 
Salaries, Directors’ Fees, 
Incentive Compensation 
(C-2) 
Securities, Stock Appreciation 
Rights, Personal Benefits 
(D) 
Aggregate of Contingent 
Forms of Remuneration 
O. C. Boileau Vice President; President, Boeing Aerospace $166,809 $641,267 $  5,338 
H. W. Haynes Executive Vice President—Chief Financial Officer 297,530 264,402 516,867 
W. M. Maulden Senior Vice President 239,587 175,897 306,902 
M. T. Stamper President 338,564 831,494 6,674 
T.A. Wilson Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 551,860 107,905 1,342,727 
All directors and officers of the Company as a group (67 persons) $7,869,462 $5,482,021 $8,362,738 
Note: parts of original footnotes deleted. 
 
 
The following tabulation shows the estimated annual pension payable to an employee, including any employee who is a director or officer, assuming retirement in 1979 
at age 65 after selected periods of service. 
 
 
Average Basic Compensation Estimated Annual Pension Payable Based on Service of: 
20 Years 25 Years 30 Years 35 Years 
$50,000 $12,684 $16,008 $19,356 $22,680 
100,000 26,928 34,008 41,100 48,180 
150,000 41,184 52,008 62,856 73,680 
200,000 55,428 70,008 84,600 99,180 
250,000 69,672 88,008 106,344 124,680 
300,000 83,928 106,008 128,100 150,180 
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Table 4, continued 
Stock Option Plans 
The following tabulation shows as to those officers named in the table on [the previous page] and as to all directors and officers as a group (1) the amount of options and 
stock appreciation rights (SAR’s) granted between January 1, 1979 and February 1, 1980, pursuant to the Company’s 1969 and 1979 Stock Option Plans, (2) the number of shares 
of the Company’s common stock acquired during such period through the exercise of options previously granted under the Plan, and the number of shares surrendered upon 
exercise of SAR’s, and (3) the number of shares subject to all unexercised options and the unexercised SAR’s held as of February 1, 1980 as adjusted for the three-for-two stock 
split effective March 12, 1979. 
 
GRANTED 1-1-79 to 2-1-80 O. C. Boileau H. W. Haynes W. M. Maulden M. T. Stamper T. A. Wilson 
All Directors and Officers as 
a Group (67 persons) 
Number of shares 3,750 4,500 3,750 6,000 10,500 138,225 
Average option price per share $46.3333 $46.3333 $46.3333 $46.3333 $46.3333 $46.0665 
Number of SAR’s 9,000 10,125 7,950 13,125 21,000 269,332 
Average Price per share of options as to 
which SAR’s were granted 
$23.32 $24.44 $25.49 $24.90 $27.00 $27.54 
EXERCISED 1-1-79 TO 2-1-80       
Number of shares 0 0 0 0 0 9,524 
Aggregate option price — — — — — $69,110 
Aggregate market value on dates of exercise — — — — — $439,472 
Number of option shares surrendered upon 
exercise of SAR’s 
36,625 6,050 11,250 22,725 0 215,296 
Aggregate option price of option shares 
surrendered upon exercies of SAR’S 
$281,631 $41,208 $88,950 $216,590 0 $1,963,316 
Aggregate market value on dates of exercise 
of SAR’s 
$1,452,618 $269,225 $497,812 $1,036,224 0 $9,479,233 
UNEXERCISED at 2-1-80       
Number of shares * 31,375 24,000 18,225 69,000 675,324 
Average options price per share — $15.37 $15.80 $23.40 $12.91 $23.60 
Number of SAR’s * 22,450 16,650 6,000 60,000 449,428 
Average price per share of options to which 
SAR’s were granted 
— $16.81 $16.91 $46.33 $14.19 $20.03 
*Mr. Boileau resigned his positions with the Company effective January 10, 1980, thereby forfeiting his right to exercise any remaining unexercised stock options and SAR’s. 
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